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IS MARBURY v. MADISON OBITER?
IS MARMURY v. MADISON OBITER?
By CHAnLEs W. BUNN*O NE Of the points decided in Marbury v. Madison' was that
the act of Congress creating the office there in question gave
the officer the right to hold it for five years independent of the
executive.
In Myers v. United States,2 October 25, 1926, Chief Justice
Taft speaking for the majority of the court held this ruling obiter
dictum.
Considering that Marbury v. Madison was decided without
argument for the defendant it would not be surprising if the court
now thought one of the points in that case was erroneously de-
cided. But after Marbury v. Madison has stood for over a hun-
dred years as a landmark of the law it is startling to be told that
the court in that case decided questions beyond its jurisdiction.
Mr. Beveridge and some other writers have taken the view
that because the act of Congress giving the court original juris-
diction of mandamus was held invalid in Marbury v. Madison
(thus showing that the court was without jurisdiction) its deci-
sion on whether Marbury was an officer was extrajudicial. This
view is evidently that of the majority of the court in Myers v.
United States. But is it right?
It must be admitted that at first blush it seems difficult to
maintain that the court had jurisdiction to decide whether Mar-
bury was an officer in a case of which it had no jurisdiction.
But it is impossible that this so obvious view should have
escaped Chief gustice Marshall and his associates. When the
case is more carefully considered it becomes apparent that the
court regarded both Marbury's title to office and whether man-
damus was an appropriate remedy as jurisdictional questions.
And is not this the true view?
Undoubtedly where a court has no jurisdiction its decision on
questions of merits is obiter. But undoubtedly it has a right
to decide every question going to the jurisdiction and its decision
on any such question is not obiter.
Marbitry v. Madison will be misunderstood unless it is borne
in mind that it was an action sought to be brought under the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The constitution
confers such jurisdiction "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
*Vice President and Special Counsel, Northern Pacific Railroad, St.
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'(1803) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137. 2 L. Ed. 60.
2(1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 21.
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public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a
party." An act of Congress added original jurisdiction "to issue
writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States."
Marbury not having a case within the original constitutional
jurisdiction was obliged, in order to come within that jurisdiction
at all, to state a case described by the act of Congress; that is he
was obliged to allege some right of person or property, infringed
by an officer of the United States, and according to the principles
and usages of law enforceable by mandamus. Had he failed to
state any property or personal right his proceeding would have
been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, not for want of merits.
Had he failed to state a right appropriately enforceable by man-
damus his proceeding would have been dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
Each of these elements was necessary, not alone to the
merits of the case, but to the original jurisdiction of the court.
If Marbury had not pleaded his right to office his action would
not have come within the original jurisdiction as defined in the
act of Congress. There would have been left a moot case, one
where a plaintiff without showing a right infringed asked the
court to pass on the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
As Marbury's pleading of his right to office was the allega-
tion of a jurisdictional fact the court was considering a juris-
dictional question in determining whether that allegation was
well founded. In this view whether Marbury had a title to
office was as much a jurisdictional question as whether the act
of Congress was invalid and whether, if so, it would be disre-
garded by the court.
This was undoubtedly the view of Chief Justice Marshall
and his associates.
If Marbury's right to office was a jurisdictional question it
will not be doubted that the court was entirely right and within
its jurisdiction in passing on that before taking up the constitu-
tional power of Congress to pass the act. The power of Con-
gress was a vastly important constitutional question and it in-
volved the most mooted unsettled question of that day; viz.,
whether the court would apply the constitution or the act of
Congress if the two disagreed. When the importance and
novelty of these questions are considered can there remain a
doubt that it was the duty of the court not to pass on them
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before it was necessary? And it was not necessary unless Mar-
bury was an officer. If he was proceeding on an ill-founded
right the court would not allow him to force its decision on
important constitutional questions. The court, perceiving that
it had no original jurisdiction unless Marbury had a right to
office, inquired into that right and was driven to decide the con-
stitutional question, only because it found he had the right.
Had the coirt asmoned Marbury's right and without particu-
lar inquiry on that head passed on to the constitutional questions,
it would seem to have been passing on the validity of an act of
Congress as an abstract question-in a case where it did not
appear to be required by rights of litigants in actual controversy.
Had the court assumed the plaintiff's right and proceeded
to hold the act of Congress invalid and therefore ineffectual,
would it not justly have been chargeable with going out of its
way to annul an act of Congress in what was apparently a moot
case? And had the court done this, its decision might justly be
called obiter, because we now learn from the opinion in Myers v.
United States that Marbury was not an officer.
This puts the court in Marbury v. Madison in what is indeed
a sad dilemma. On one hand where it inquired first whether
Marbury was really an officer its decision on that point is said
to be obiter dictum by the majority opinion in Myers v. United
States, because the court had no jurisdiction of mandamus. But
on the other hand it is submitted that a decision solely on the
constitutional question would have been universally regarded as
obiter because rendered in a case where the right of the plain-
tiff to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court was more
than doubtful and not passed upon.
There is no escape from this absurd supposed dilemma of
the court except in the view that Marbury's right to office was
a jurisdictional question; just as much jurisdictional as whether
the act of Congress was valid. It seems certain that this must
have been the view of Chief Justice Marshall and his associates.
They state the order in which the questions were to be considered
and in that order they said they were first to decide whether
Marbury was an officer. 3 They were not oblivious to so plain
a proposition, as that they could not decide merits in a case of
which they had no jurisdiction. Conceding that they recognized
this very obvious principle they must have regarded Marbury's
allegation of right to an office as a jurisdictional averment.
3Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137, 154, 2 L. Ed. 60.
